Platonic Ethics doesn't end with the Euthyphro

I've noted my interest in the concept of theosis before , and it seems to have come up yet again. Right Reason takes Simon Blackburn to task for his overly-casual dismissal of Elizabeth Anscombe's ethical writings. Blackburn seems to follow the habit of so many readers of philosophy who treat the Euthyphro dialogue as Plato's last word on the relation between ethics and the divine, while ignoring his other commentaries. Frederick Copleston dilligently summarizes Platonic ethics in his History of Philosophy, a relevant section of which being this one:

Now, happiness must be attained by the pursuit of virtue, which means becoming as like to God as it is possible for man to become. We must become "like the divine so far as we can, and that again is to become righteous with the help of wisdom"(Theatetus 176 b 1-3) "The gods have a care of anyone whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain to the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue." (Rep. 613 a 7-b) In The Laws Plato declares that "God is the measure of all things, in a sense far higher than any man, as they say, can hope to be..."

Platonic divinization bears a not insignificant similarity to that concept of theosis especially prominent in Eastern Christianity, not to mention the Christian devotional practices encouraging the imitation of Christ. Indeed, the Catholic Catechism itself quotes St. Gregory of Nyssa: "the goal of the virtuous life is to become like God."(CCC para. 1803, orig. from De Virtutibus)

Most undergraduates never seem to get past the Euthyphro, which is terribly tragic. I do hope Simon Blackburn, an eminent philosopher himself, hasn't set a poor example for them.